The U.S. strategy to assure freedom of access in space hinges on Space Situation Awareness (SSA): the ability to find and track space objects and determine their capability and intent. As a result, AFSPC is investing much to overhaul the aging sensors, network the sensors to enable data sharing and dissemination timeliness, and improve the tactics, techniques, and procedures required to integrate space surveillance into the command and control operations at the Joint Space Operations Center. Regardless, AFSPC is projecting a shortfall in deep space characterization and SSA responsiveness at the end of the mid-term planning cycle in 2020.
Chapter 1: Introduction
The U.S. military, intelligence, civil, and commercial sectors are heavily reliant on space.
In fact, space systems have transformed the military's ability to fight and win wars by delivering precision navigation for surgical attack, secure communication linking command and control (C2) nodes and enabling blue force tracking, missile warning, weather services, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). The civil and commercial markets have benefited from GPS-enabled navigation, wireless communication, satellite television and radio, and commercial ISR ventures such as Google Maps. The Industrial Technology Research Institute predicts that GPS business revenues alone will grow to $21.5 billion in 2008. 1 According to the U.S. National
Space Policy, the U.S. "national security is critically dependent on space capabilities, and this dependence will grow." 2 Many, including our enemies, view this critical dependence on space as a critical vulnerability. To ensure freedom of action in space, General Chilton (commander, AFSPC) and Major General Shelton (commander, 14 th AF, and STRATCOM's JF-CC Space)
have made space situation awareness (SSA) their number one priority. 3 After all, defense and response are not enabled without a network of sensors to detect, track, and disseminate a shared situation awareness. The goal of this paper is to show that despite much investment in the near and mid-term, a critical shortfall of SSA in 2020 will continue to be responsiveness unless the Air Force invests now in artificial cognition technology for autonomous operations.
Space Situation Awareness Background
The definition of SSA has evolved to mean much more than space surveillance given the array of spacecraft and threats projected in future operations. In the past, the space surveillance network (SSN) primarily conducted routine space catalog maintenance to support collision avoidance. The mission of the 1 st Space Control Squadron required "detecting, identifying, and tracking more than 8,500 objects in space, some as small as a few centimeters in diameter." 4 A less publicized fact is that there are 11,001 known objects, leaving 2,625 objects not cataloged, including 38 satellites lost in near earth orbits and 131 satellites lost in deep space orbits. 5 Additionally, the proliferation of small satellites is stressing the sensitivity and resolution of the existing sensors. "Since 1991, about 10 nations have launched 373 small satellites into orbit, each weighing less than 1000 lbs." 6 Matters get worse with time as the number of small satellites orbited per launch increases with inventions such as the ESPA ring and miniaturization efforts ongoing at universities such as Surrey reduce the size of spacecraft for niche missions to the nano-satellite class (<10 kg, 1m 3 ). 7 Further, the threat of various ground and orbital attack scenarios continues to increase, including anti-satellites (ASATs), high altitude nuclear bursts, ground-based lasers, and satellites with secondary intent. 8 To keep up with these trends, General
Chilton believes SSA requires much more than surveillance, it requires the capability to "identify what's up there, understand its mission and, ultimately, determine its intent." 9 The following scenario, highlighted recently in much of the media coverage of the Chinese ASAT tests, 10 shows the huge challenges faced by SSA. If an ASAT launches today without warning against an intelligence asset, a Defense Satellite Program (DSP) spacecraft detects the launch, provides missile warning, and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) assets track it. This is nearly autonomous and controlled primarily within a single C2 node (the Joint National
Intelligence Center, JNIC). 11 The breakdown comes in the lack of connectivity between the various ground stations and C2 nodes of the USAF, MDA, and the intelligence community (IC).
In all likelihood, the ASAT destroys the intelligence asset long gone before the ground station receives an alert email or phone call. According to General Chilton, "the key element is time. It takes us six months to figure out the capability of a [newly launched space platform]. Our vision is, we'll know in one rev [orbit] ." 12 Further, the amount of coordination required and the short timelines for these events demonstrate the need to collaborate to create a single space picture and create a common C2 network to synergize the array of space assets for the greater defense of all.
According to the Counterspace Mission Area Plan:
SSA encompasses traditional space surveillance (satellite/debris positional data, maneuvers, changes in space order of battle [SOB] , etc.), more detailed reconnaissance of specific space assets (mission identification, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.) and analysis of the space environment and its effects (solar storms, meteor showers, etc.). It also includes the use of traditional intelligence sources to provide insight into adversary space operations and the fusion of all data and information into actionable knowledge that can be used by the warfighter or decision maker… [It] involves the collection, processing, fusion and assessment of data and information from many different sources and disseminates information to decision makers and various users. 13 SSA consists of four sub-mission areas: surveillance and reconnaissance (S&R), environmental monitoring (EM), intelligence, and C2; each with their own significant hurdles in the near term. Key challenges in S&R include finding 100 percent of the catalogue (at least the satellites) and providing the persistence, accuracy, and responsiveness required to characterize high interest spacecraft and tactical events. Providing persistent EM coverage and integrating with S&R and intelligence data for anomaly resolution will be even harder in the near and mid term as the number of dedicated sensors decreases. 14 Intelligence refers to the use of traditional intelligence sources to provide insight into satellite characteristics, capabilities, users and networks, ground operations, and intent as well as any information pertaining to ground or space based threats. Providing timely and actionable intelligence and integrating across multiple intelligence sources and the rest of the SSA sensors (e.g. S&R, EM) continues to be a significant hurdle. Finally, C2 contains perhaps the greatest challenge of collecting and fusing the information, creating a single integrated space picture, and disseminating the information in time to enable a defense or appropriate response. The goal of this research paper is to highlight the single greatest capability shortfall that will remain unchecked by AFRL, AFSPC, and DARPA technology investments at the end of the mid-term planning window: responsiveness. To accomplish this, Chapter 2 highlights the current SSA capability shortfalls and lists the planned material, non-material, and strategy solutions that can erase all of the shortfalls except responsiveness by 2020. Next, Chapter 3 unveils the primary reason that responsiveness will continue to plague the SSA network in 2020:
the current net-centric warfare insistence on human cognition and man-in-the-loop. Raven, 18 PanSTARRS). 19 The cost of these sensor upgrades limit the number of sensors AFSPC can purchase and as a result, the network will continue to have difficulty finding small objects at GEO and fall short of the required responsiveness due in large part to a shortfall in persistent coverage enabled by more sensors.
With the surveillance architecture in place, the next step is to characterize each object via reconnaissance and intelligence sources to identify space objects and determine capability and intent. The dedicated X-Band and S-band sensors improve NE characterization coverage and sensitivity, while various MDA collateral sensors will continue to support NE missions as well.
While SST is a significant improvement over GEODDS in the area of search, limited resolution will limit its characterization effectiveness at DS. In fact, AFSPC is forecasting a GEO imaging shortfall with no current planned solutions. 20 DARPA is also investing much to improve the NE and DS capability of contributing sensors, such as Haystack and Starfire Optical Range (SOR), to image and characterize spacecraft returns, via the Deepview and Longview programs, respectively. 21 In addition, AFSPC is requesting support from the intelligence community for spacecraft characterization. 22 However, past analysis suggests that while AFSPC can rely on the IC for "most intelligence to supplement current AFSPC capability … better partnering to acquire its own electronic support assets" is required. 23 The bottom line remains that sensor upgrades and intelligence support will overcome much of the NE characterization shortfalls, but coverage, imagery, and timeliness shortfalls will persist in DS. 24 The EM community has many challenges but appears to be on the path to integrating environmental data into the single space picture. 26 Events requiring responsive intelligence include maneuvers, collisions, and attack of space assets from the ground or space. A critical shortfall will continue to be the seamless integration of the intelligence network with the rest of the space network and timely or responsive intelligence (including cueing of collection assets) to support tactical space events.
The joint space C2 node, the JSpOC, is making great strides to creating an integrated SSA picture. Many of the functions outlined in this paper may occur at the SPADOC but to reduce complexity, the paper will focus attention of SSA C2 at the JSpOC. Currently, the JSpOC is creating links to the SPADOC, ground sites and C2 nodes (STRATCOM, MDA, IC), developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to respond to events, and prove out the process of collecting, fusing and disseminating data to the space community and combatant commanders. The foundation of the JSpOC's C2 strategy is net centricity -the creation of a common networked repository for shared situation awareness to enable well-informed decisions.
While the TPED improves connectivity and provides an operating picture for the JSpOC, AFRL is integrating TTPs via various decision support tools. 27 Next, the Extended Space Surveillance Architecture (ESSA) program is demonstrating the utility of "integrating multiple sensors/ platforms (e.g. SSN, missile defense, intelligence, etc.) in a net-centric environment to allow multiple mission areas to discover and use data." 28 Each sensor records the output data (e.g. metric data, SOI data, imagery) to a sidecar and publishes it to a network shared by all the sensors, C2 nodes and the JSpOC. Figure 2 .1 displays a schematic of the resulting SSA network.
While developing the links, TTPs, decision support tools, and net-centricity are necessary first steps, much work is required to link and sidecar collateral, contributing, EM, and even intelligence sensors for integration into the single picture, automate the data mining and data fusion for timely routine support, and enable responsive operations.
Appendix A summarizes the planned SSN roadmap and displays the resulting sensor locations in 2020. SSA is meaningless if the SSN is not tracking everything on orbit -at least the satellites.
In 1998, the launch of Space-Based Visible (SBV) reduced the "number of lost objects in GEO orbit by over a factor of two." 31 This shows that while the SSN is great at catalog maintenance, it is deficient in finding lost and small objects. The challenge is getting the initial vector. To do this, the U.S. should offer incentives to the amateur, academic, commercial, and allied communities to find lost spacecraft and newly orbited objects from foreign launches. One option is for AFSPC to offer cash awards as the asteroid community proposed in an act of Congress to leverage amateur astronomers to find asteroids for $3000 per object found. 32 A second option rewards contributors with reciprocal access to the unclassified SSA data or two line element sets either via direct connectivity or via a website similar to the AFSPC implemented Space Track site that is currently restricting access to registered users. 33 Alternatively, lost assets can be found by routine sweeps of the GEO belt via residual operations of DARPA or AFRL platforms (e.g. XSS-11) or by drifting satellites, nearing end of life, of limited surveillance capability (DoD or leased commercial assets). The goal is to reduce and possibly eliminate the "lost" catalog. analyze all MDA, intelligence, civil/academic, research, commercial sites, orbiting assets, and even test assets for potential utility as AFSPC once did for SBV -a test asset that currently contributes 23.9 percent of the DS metric track missions. 35 In the past, AFSPC has denied the request of some sensors to support the network because the sensor did not satisfy the most stressing characterization or search requirements. Examples include STSS, Sea-Based X-Band, and NFIRE. 36 The goal of these sensors should not be to replace the dedicated sensors, but rather to plug gaps in coverage and offload many of the routine catalog functions, such as tracking large bright objects. Use these sensors to perform most of the unclassified or collateral missions to free up the dedicated sensors to perform S&R on high interest objects and be available to respond to events. In the future, all sensors that provide niche surveillance, SOI, or reconnaissance data must be "sidecarred" and added to the network.
Incentives to join and contribute to the network vary for each mission partner. For MDA and the IC, networking the sensors not only enables SSA to leverage them, it enables them to leverage the SSA for the cross-cueing missions likely to be required in the future between the various mission areas. The ASAT example in Chapter 1 is a perfect example of the synergy required between the three networks to enable a timely defense. Next, the civil, commercial, and allied sensor owners should know that "if you contribute you gain access to the SSA network's data." The SSN should seek agreements with universities and allies around the world, especially Australia, Africa, and South America where coverage is limited. Appendix B lists the array of highly capable large aperture telescopes under development around the world. Alternatively, the SSN could lease sensors for niche missions as recently proposed by SMC as a space version of the civil reserve air fleet (Space CRAF). 37 Such ideas are not only limited to ground sensors.
The SSN should look to improve DS S&R coverage by seeking out contributing space sensors and adding payloads (e.g. web-cameras, small telescopes, CEASE, etc.) to planned space systems as SMDC recently did to Intelsat. 38 Again, to be effective, each sensor must link to the SSA network via sidecar, be available for SSA tasking, and publish real-time data to the net.
Soliciting SSA contributions from others is such a high payoff area that AFSPC should establish an office in TENCAP. This office should perform the missions above to search for contributing sensors, platforms to leverage with future SSA payloads, or systems with residual operations capability. Start with a budget of $10M/year and assess the program annually. 39 The next strategy upgrade entails accepting that not everything needs to be persistent or timely and not everyone is a threat. Persistent surveillance is essential to enable timely event detection and anomaly resolution. However, the SSN must obtain exquisite characterization via reconnaissance and intelligence collection to determine capability and intent for objects of high interest or suspicion before an event takes place. Like air attack and cruise missile defense, space attack timelines leave little time to gain further information or intelligence about a potential threat during the attack. Thus, sweeps to obtain exquisite characterization for high interest objects, like the sweeps needed to find lost GEO objects, can become routine or pre-planned missions. Finally, to plug the high interest characterization and GEO imagery shortfalls AFSPC should discard the "Cadillac" mindset and avoid building the ultra-capable systems with lifetimes of 5 or more years at a cost of approximately $500M each, such as the previous ODSI program. 40 Instead, AFSPC should utilize AFRL's miniaturization and bus technologies, take advantage of AFRL's XSS-11 and ANGELS micro-sat programs, and launch smaller, less capable systems in GEO drift orbits. 41 After all, the entire XSS-11 program cost was "$82M, including launch, operations, the spacecraft itself, and all the ground control hardware." All contributors to SSA must integrate into a single network. First, the SSN must utilize recent developments in the way of multilevel security and create a seamless integration of intelligence data into the SSA database for a single SSA picture. Second, the SSN must define the intelligence products of interest to characterize space systems and determine intent (e.g. communication wavelengths, network links and nodes, threat-specific spectral bands, etc.) with enough detail to simplify the required intelligence collection and data mining. Of course, much analysis must still go on within the IC, but automating as much of the data mining as possible frees up the analysts to make sense of the data or fill in items that require humans, such as analyzing imagery. Finally, the JSpOC should collect the intelligence products, integrate them into a single folder for a given asset (like AFRL's Satellite Information Database) 44 and combine with S&R sidecars and EM data to create a single folder with status for each space asset. As stated earlier, start with the assets of interest and populate those folders first. The goal of the second tier (the dedicated sensors) of the SSA network is to work with the EM and intelligence community to populate these folders while the first tier of SSA sensors performed the routine persistent surveillance for the sake of event detection.
Remaining Shortfalls in 2020
The above discussion summarized various planned and recommended solutions to provide persistent surveillance, integrate data from multiple communities via net centricity, populate space object folders, and create a layered SSA defense to free up dedicated assets to monitor high interest objects and respond to tactical events. The overall goal is to bring as many sensors and as much data as possible onto a network accessible to the operators and decision makers to enable data mining and fusion, analysis, decision support, and timely information dissemination. While the sensors enable coverage and persistence and the net-centricity enables data sharing and dissemination, the network C2 is still the chief limiter to enabling responsive operations. On the current path, SSA will fail to be responsive in 2020 due to insistence on having a man in the loop and a critical technology shortfall in the area of artificial cognition.
Chapter 3: Transforming SSA C2 to be Responsive
The capability to detect, monitor, and respond to tactical events such as the ASAT scenario outlined in Chapter 1 requires a SSA network that does much more than link distributed sensors to share data for a common situation awareness. It requires a level of automation that violates the current net-centric warfare (NCW) doctrine and JSpOC strategy of operations. This chapter outlines a strategy to overcome these final obstacles to responsiveness.
Net Centric Warfare Limitations
The goal of NCW is to achieve an asymmetric information advantage, via data sharing, which enables synchronization of efforts on the battlefield by ensuring the entire force is operating from a common operational picture. 45 There are three domains of NCW: physical, informational, and cognitive. The physical domain consists of the systems to be linked and the communication network sharing the data, the information domain is "where the information is created, manipulated, and shared," and the cognitive domain "is in the minds of the participants
[and] the place where perceptions, awareness, [and] understanding … reside and where, as a result of sensemaking, decisions are made." 46 In the SSA arena, the physical domain consists of the contributing SSA sensors (S&R, EM, intelligence, contributing and collateral), their ground stations, links to the network, and the physical network itself, the information domain includes the sidecars, fusion algorithms, and analysis tools, and the cognitive domain resides within the minds of the JSpOC operators. The success of the network hinges on its ability to ensure information superiority and is a function of the completeness of the data, the accessibility to that data, and the timeliness of data dissemination for shared awareness. Further, current NCW theory assumes that "decision superiority results from superior information filtered through a warfighter's experience, knowledge, training, and judgment." 47 This is debatable.
Careful analysis of military decision-making theory shows that the current NCW insistence on human cognitive is its chief limitation. Though multiple sources agree, "the next technology game-changer in military operations … will be in the area of cognition," 48,49 they focus primarily on decision support software to aid the human decision maker. 50 Due to the impact of military decisions, NCW theory assumes that "only humans command," primarily for the sake of accountability. Even the proponents of such theory concede, "For the foreseeable future, the ultimate decision maker will remain human, despite our slowness and fallibility." While the timeframe associated with most of the threats, from detection to impact, ranges from seconds to minutes, any single step in the process can take a human over an hour (AT BEST). The ASAT scenario demonstrates the level of integration required of the JSpOC and MDA and IC nodes. For this discussion, assume these communities achieve the required level of synergy before 2020 and integrate their C2 structures or perhaps make the JFCC-Space the supported commander during space attacks. How much time will it take to determine the IC, MDA, and SSN assets in range to track and monitor the event, task these sensors, and receive the data to enable a response or defense? Every step that requires a human decision maker or even worse requires "coordination" with a chain of command or other organization will lead to mission failure. SSA would not be the first mission area to conclude that time-critical scenarios require automation. Cruise missile defense faces a five-minute timeline and experts believe "the limiting factor will be human decision times" only overcome with "automated decision-making aids, machine-to-machine links, automatic target identification, [and] cueing to tell me where to focus my search." 53 After all, there is not enough time to sift through data, develop courses of action, rack and stack them, and make a decision in time to respond.
Though some experts use complexity of the decision to determine ability to automate, it might be better to look at the complexity of the network. Given the vast amount of information associated with the event at hand -the various supporting assets, the historical data, the array of options, and the complexity of the given situation (orbits, velocities, sensor capabilities, etc.) -the JSpOC must determine the optimal division of labor between the machines and man. There are three classes of military decisions: simple, contingent, and complex. 54 Simple decisions are those that are obvious upon completion of the observation and identification steps of Figure 3 .1.
Contingent decisions require a bit more data on the intention and threat assessment, but the response is obvious upon completion of the threat assessment step. Finally, complex decisions are difficult to model, hard to predict, require much information to understand, and likely have many potential courses of action to respond. According to current theory, only simple decisions and contingent decisions are automatable. Some scenarios are so straightforward (e.g. ASAT and high altitude nuclear detonation) that the SSA decision is simple and requires cueing of assets to determine threat location to enable a response. This is clearly automatable.
On the other hand, complex scenarios require more information to assess the threat.
Examples include a single event upset, a subsystem failure, interference, a laser attack on system without optical sensors, or a satellite drifting off course. According to theory, these situations are so complex that they require analysis from "grey beards" familiar with the space systems.
This may suffice for after action reports, but will not meet the timeliness requirement. Further, many events require gathering more information by cueing available S&R, EM, and IC sensors, fusing the information from multiple sensors and possible multiple platforms, and comparing with historical data, to resolve anomaly from attack. While many reserve this highest level of complexity for the human decision maker, the sheer volume of information and level of fusion required make it impossible for anyone but a computer to accomplish. Thus, one could argue that simple decisions "can" be automated and complex decisions "must" be automated.
Assuming commanders agree with the timeliness and complexity arguments above, there is one remaining argument against automation: it is too hard. Common arguments against automation are that humans cannot teach computers creativity, reasoning, course of action generation, consideration of external factors and indirect consequences. 55 One could argue that we cannot always teach humans these skills and, as a result, the consistency of their decisions varies widely across different operators in identical situations. Regardless, recent advances in artificial intelligence, computer learning, and computer reasoning are the best hopes of driving the SSA network to provide the responsiveness to tactical events. As a result, the operators must When the network detects an event or anomaly it automatically takes over cognition and switches to autonomous mode. Contributing/Collateral sensors made available for tasking should continue maintaining the catalog. After all, if this first event is a feint, we do not want to lose timeliness to detect other events. Meanwhile, the network autonomously performs the multi-level fusion of recent sensor data, performs historical data comparisons, cues dedicated and IC sensors to obtain more information, and iterates until it converges on its most related description of the event or anomaly. While this iterative process is occurring, streaming status information on the pertinent object folders and relevant data passes to the JSpOC, relevant ground stations, and C2 nodes. The goal is to autonomously obtain and fuse the data required to understand the situation in time to enable a defense or response. The autonomous mode will obtain the required SSA data and the operator will retain the ability to override the network operations or augment these operations until the event or anomaly is resolved.
Chapter 4: Transforming SSA Artificial Cognition
Many technology areas must progress in parallel to create the level of artificial cognition required to achieve responsive SSA by 2020. This chapter lists the specific SSA cognitive goals, describes the technology contributions of others with similar cognitive goals, highlights the technology focus areas requiring more attention, and introduces a plan to mature these technologies to achieve the level of artificial cognition required for responsive operations.
Artificial Cognition Capabilities Required
Tracing the net-centric operations outlined in section 3.2 through the OODA loop of Figure 3 .1 for two of the harder to detect threats reveals the specific capabilities required of the routine and autonomous operating modes. Consider the case of out of band communication jamming or an out of band laser attack. In the absence of dedicated in band threat warning receivers, the network must collect sensor and spacecraft telemetry data, fuse the data of multiple spacecraft along with EM and IC data, compare with historical data, detect the change (on one or more satellites), and resolve whether it was a spacecraft anomaly, weather event or an attack.
Confirmation of attack triggers the autonomous mode. The network must rescan the data, compare with memory from past attacks to diagnose the attack type, and fuse the data from multiple sources to predict attack location. The network retrieves threat data while either cueing assets to collect more data or requesting information from the IC to monitor the event and determine intent (e.g. deny, degrade, destroy, or even accident). At every instant an abbreviated portion of the analyzed data, resulting pertinent information, status of network operations, and recommendations are streaming in to the operator in the JSpOC.
Thus, the computer has multiple requirements across the routine and autonomous modes.
The goal of the computer during routine operations is support the operator, detect events, and train for autonomous operations. During routine operations, the computer mines data to populate object folders, archives sensor and spacecraft data, fuses and analyzes data from disparate sources (multiple spacecraft, EM, IC, MDA, etc.), compares with historical data, and uses various decision support tools and machine-human interface algorithms to refine and present the data. The computer must demonstrate reasoning to determine what data to scan and what to look for, memory and pattern recognition to search for event indicators, and logic to infer or confirm if an attack took place. Autonomous operations require all this, on a much shorter time scale, and with the added requirement of reasoning to cue dedicated assets or request data from the IC to classify the event, pattern recognition to identify the attacker, and logic to infer intention. In short, both modes require a high degree of artificial intelligence, with a potentially infinite pool of data, and desire resolution and justification within minutes.
Mission Partners Supporting Artificial Cognition
Several communities have similar capability requirements and are helping drive the artificial cognition technology. According to the Chapter 3, networks of high complexity, requiring the integration of many disparate inputs to enable decisions in extremely short timescales necessitate automation. Missions that have acknowledged the need for a cognitive network capable of a degree of autonomous operations are cruise missile defense, 56 responsive logistics, 57 Defensive Counterspace (DCS), 58 the ISR community, 59 and defensive network operations. 60 The ISR community is contributing multi-level security enabled networks, data mining, and object folders. The jamming attack listed above is a classic DCS example that has led to the development of neural networks to diagnose attack based on satellite telemetry via the Satellite-as-a-Sensor program. 61 The current program analyzes historical data and is strictly
Bayesian in the sense of analyzing all satellite parameters (without prediction of the most pertinent parameters). However, according to the network operations community, it is possible to combine the Bayesian analysis with "expert" systems analysis (limiting search parameters to those known to be pertinent) to significantly reduce the false alarm rate. 62 In addition, focused logistics is driving much development in the fields of automated reasoning and decision-making.
But the number one mission area to leverage for network operations and artificial cognition is cruise missile defense. In fact, the ESSA sidecar and net centric approach came from the MDA Hercules program concept. 63 In Stanford. 66 Two current DARPA IPTO programs, REAL and IL, provide basic research in the areas of automated learning and reasoning. 67 The current projects in academia entail creating and testing decision making architectures, often via war gaming, and appear to lack direct application in the near term. 68 Much AI investment continues in the area of modeling the human brain and nervous system for medical applications, but appears to be more relevant to multi-level fusion than artificial cognition. 69 Finally, AFRL investments in this area focus on decision support tools (e.g. WebTAS) 70 and man-machine interfaces (Master Caution Panel). 71 The discussion above shows that while there is much going on in the area of AI and cognition, the investments are not focused. Thus, a coherent strategy outlining specific milestones for SSA artificial cognition is required to enable responsive operations in 2020.
SSA Cognition Strategy
The strategy discussion below assumes the strategy and technology improvements recommended in Chapter 2 are in place. Specifically, assume the IC, MDA, and SSA networks are integrated, all sensors contain sidecars and publish to the network, and all sensors are automatable and taskable. In short the physical domain is enabled.
The first phase of development entails preparing for routine operations and is humandriven. In this phase, the humans retain full cognition, improve their understanding of the mission area (through education, experience, and exercises), and direct the scope and goals of the computer-based data mining, fusing, and analysis. Humans use computers to perform timeintensive and numerically intensive analysis and humans utilize decision support software and human-machine interface developments to make sense of the computer analysis. In addition, the humans demonstrate the ability to share and mine data in a multilevel security environment, the ability to automate individual sensors, and the ability to cue multiple assets on a given event. In the mean time, the operators study the mission area, analyze the threats, develop TTPs, and study methods to detect attacks. The network performs change detection by looking for signals and events predicted by the human. In short, the human commands the network to provide shared situation awareness. By transitioning much of the technology implemented in C2BMC, this is technically achievable today and already under development at the JSpOC and SPADOC. 72 The goal of the second phase is to train the computer to improve its cognitive abilities.
At this point, the humans are the knowledgeable grey beards armed with rules of thumb, on-thejob experience, and a good understanding of the various moving parts. On the other hand, the computer is the new, but ingenious, kid on the block. The goal of the humans in this phase is to teach the machines the mission area to enable artificial cognition and autonomous operations.
First, a data archive and analysis node is required to store historical data, enable higherlevel data analysis and fusion, and serve as a training node to train the computer and test software and algorithms before integrating into the operational network. MDA currently uses the X-LAB adjacent to the JNIC to prove out decision support and fusion algorithms and sidecar upgrades. 73 Given its enormous processing power and its proximity to a contributing sensor node (MSSS), the Maui High Performance Computing Center (MHPCC) is an optimal location for the data archive/training node. After all, the MHPCC already performs data analysis, analyzes orbits for SSA architecture assessments via the SSNAM tool, and conducts basic research with teams from the University of Hawaii. The node must employ a core team of SSA experts to establish a simulated SPADOC, integrate existing algorithms, and train the MHPCC to perform data mining, data fusion, and data correlation, and employ decision support algorithms to simulate the SPADOC operations. The multi-level data fusion algorithms should employ a mixture of Bayesian and "expert" logic. In other words, the experts must help the computer by estimating the pertinent parameters to search for to detect and characterize events. This will greatly reduce processing time in the short term and get the ball rolling. The third and final phase involves releasing cognition to the network. Cognition must transition to the network for all areas that it has demonstrated an ability to accomplish more effectively than the grey beards. In the end, it will be a team effort and the goal is not to retire the human grey beard but to share cognition between the humans and computers to optimize responsiveness. As the cognitive tools are developed, tested, refined, and ultimately proven, they should be integrated with the decision support, data mining, and data fusion tools already in the JSpOC to hand over cognition as the computer comes up to speed on specific tasks.
Autonomous mode and the precise cognitive relationship between human and network will take years to iron out and will likely change with each upgrade to the network. The best methods to test the autonomous mode are to use the various R&D and operational tests being The goal is to give the network/human team enough practice to identify procedural shortfalls, and optimize the division of labor to maximize efficiency and timeliness. With each exercise, the humans should automate whatever the network demonstrates an ability to consistently, accurately, and quickly accomplish. To confirm the responsiveness of the network, the array of simulated attack scenarios should be red-teamed against the network to confirm the timeliness of the detect, characterize, ID, and infer intention phases of the SSA network.
Chapter 5: Next Steps
Space Situation Awareness is AFSPC's number one technology focus area in the near term. Despite this, various AFSPC, NSSO, and AFRL documents forecast capability shortfalls in 2020. This paper recommended several refinements to the SSA strategy to reduce the number of shortfalls to one: responsiveness. This chapter will summarize the key recommendations of the paper and outline future steps for artificial cognition and net centric operations.
Key Recommendations
AFSPC has few dollars remaining after the planned investments to overhaul the dedicated sensors, but projects a critical shortfall in the area of SSA responsiveness in 2020. Rather than solving all the shortfalls (e.g. DS S&R of small objects, finding the lost catalog, and persistent DS S&R) with costly technology solutions, this paper recommended various strategy refinements to leverage the low hanging fruit. Examples include rewarding civil, commercial, or allies for finding lost spacecraft, launching less-capable satellites routinely on rideshares to characterize DS high interest objects, and drifting satellites nearing end of life through the GEO belt to reduce the "lost" catalog. On the other hand, to enable responsiveness, we need more sensors, we need dedicated assets to focus their attention on high interest objects, and we need to ensure we are not one-deep in coverage in high interest areas limiting our ability to respond to multiple events.
As a result, the natural recommendation is to increase the number of sensors, create a layered SSA approach, and bring all contributing space systems and sensors onto a single network (including IC and MDA assets) to enable data sharing and timely information dissemination.
With this foundation in place, the paper focused on the need to reduce man in the loop and invest in artificial cognition to automate much of the SSA functions to overcome the complexity and timelines required in 2020. Though the strategy followed the template used by MDA in creating a data node to develop decision support tool, two things distinguish MDA from SSA. First, MDA has not fully embraced the need for artificial cognition yet and SSA does not have the amount of funding that MDA has devoted to C2BMC. The strategy of creating an AI center at a network node and populating it with AI scientists is a cost effective way of vectoring AFRL, DARPA, and universities brainpower to accelerate the artificial cognition capability.
Next Steps
This paper showed the struggle between humans and machines. Various mission areas are adopting net centric approaches and are currently building architectures to link to the GIG and share data. As a result, operators will be inundated with an unprecedented amount of data.
With the exponential increase in complexity of the battlefield and the shrinking timelines for attack (e.g. cruise missiles, ASATs, network viruses), many mission areas will wrestle with the idea of automation. Though the current NCW visions suggest that decision support tools can keep humans in the loop, at some point the complexity will be too great and the timelines too short. To prepare for the complex, fast-paced future, each mission area must determine the optimal division of labor between the network and the warfighter.
Second, this paper showed that integrating the various space participants even for SSA is a coordination and C2 nightmare. We can no longer view the JFCC-Space as a supporting commander. We need a plan to integrate all of space into a single chain of command in the event of an attack so that all space participants know who is in charge and who are the supported and supporting commanders. Without this C2 structure, the simple tasks of cueing assets can degrade into coordination battles that will eliminate the responsiveness enabled by artificial cognition.
Finally, this paper focused primarily on the artificial cognition required to solve the most obvious shortfall -timely attack detection and reporting. Obvious next steps include increasing connectivity to other relevant networks, to include allies, and seeking out additional data sources that may be of utility to increase the amount of data accessible by the network. However, while this paper focused on the things we know we need the computer to do (e.g. data mine, data fuse, etc.), it did not discuss on the possible searches that the computer may initiate to seek higher levels of correlation and predictability within the network and perhaps correlations with other networks when humans are not looking.
Humans must learn to trust the network to perform autonomously. Otherwise, human cognition timelines will continue to limit network operations and the U.S. will remain vulnerable to a space pearl harbor. Artificial cognition is the technology of the future. 
